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THE FUNCTION OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY*
ROSCOE POUND**
For twenty-four hundred years-from the Greek thinkers of the
fifth century B.c. who asked whether right was right by nature or
only by enactment and convention, to the social philosophers of to-
day, who seek the ends, the ethical basis and the enduring principles
of social control-the philosophy of law has taken a leading role in
all study of human institutions. The perennial struggle of American
administrative law with nineteenth-century constitutional formula-
tions of Aristotle's threefold classification of governmental power, the
stone wall of natural righfs against which attempts to put an end to
private war in industrial disputes for a long time dashed in vain, and
the notion of a logically derivable superconstitution, of which actual
written constitutions are faint and imperfect reflections, which was a
clog upon social legislation in the nineteenth and the first decade of
the present century, long bore witness how thoroughly the philosophi-
cal legal thinking of the past is a force in the administration of justice
of the present. Indeed the everyday work of the courts was never
more completely shaped by abstract philosophical ideas than in the
nineteenth century when lawyers affected to despise philosophy and
analytical jurists believed they had set up a self-sufficient science of
law which stood in no need of any philosophical apparatus.
In all stages of what may be described fairly as legal development
philosophy has been a useful servant. But in some it has, been a
tyrannous servant and in all but form a master. It has been used to
break down the authority of outworn tradition, to bend authoritative-
ly imposed rules that admitted of no change to new uses which
changed profoundly their practical effect, to bring new elements into
the law from without and make new bodies of law from these new
materials, to organize and systematize existing legal materials and
to fortify established rules and institutions when periods of growth
were succeeded by periods of stability and of merely formal recon-
struction. Such have been its actual achievements. Yet all the while
its professed aim has been much more ambitious. It has sought to
give us a complete and final picture of social control. It has sought to
lay down a moral and legal and political chart for all time. It has had
faith that it could find the everlasting, unchangeable legal reality in
which we might rest, and could enable us to establish a perfect law
* Reprinted with the special permission of the author and of the Yale Uni-
versity Press from Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, ch. 1
(rev. ed. 1954).
** Dean Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
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by which human relations might be ordered forever without uncer-
tainty and freed from need of change. Nor may we scoff at this am-
bitious aim and this lofty faith. They have been not the least factors
in the power of legal philosophy to do the less ambitious things which
in their aggregate are the bone and sinew of legal achievement. For
the attempt at the larger program has led philosophy of law inci-
dentally to do the things that were immediately and practically
serviceable, and the doing of these latter, as it were sub specie
aeternitatis, has given enduring worth to what seemed but by-
products of philosophical inquiry.
Two needs have determined philosophical thinking about law. On
the one hand, the paramount social interest in the general security,
which as an interest in peace and order dictated the very beginnings
of law, has led men to seek some fixed basis of a certain ordering of
human action which should restrain magisterial as well as individual
willfulness and assure a firm and stable social order. On the other
hand, the pressure of less immediate social interests, and the need
of reconciling them with the exigencies of the general security and of
making continual new compromises because of continual changes in
society have called ever for readjustment at least of the details of the
social order. They have called continually for overhauling of legal
precepts and for refitting them to unexpected situations. And this
has led men to seek principles of legal development by which to
escape from authoritative rules which they feared or did not know
how to reject but could no longer apply to advantage. These principles
of change and growth, however, might easily prove inimical to the
general security, and it was important to reconcile or unify them
with the idea of a fixed basis of the legal order. Thus the philosopher
has sought to construct theories of law and theories of lawmaking
and has sought to unify them by some ultimate solving idea equal to
the task of yielding a perfect law which should stand fast forever.
From the time when lawgivers gave over the attempt to maintain
the general security by belief that particular bodies of human law
had been divinely dictated or divinely revealed or divinely sanctioned,
they have had to wrestle with the problem of proving to mankind
that the law was something fixed and settled, whose authority was
beyond question, while at the same time enabling it to make constant
readjustments and occasional radical changes under the pressure of
infinite and variable human desires. The philosopher has worked
upon this problem with the materials of the actual legal systems of
the time and place or with the legal materials of the past upon which
his generation had built. Hence in closer view philosophies of law
have been attempts to give a rational account of the law of the time
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and place, or attempts to formulate a general theory of the legal order
to meet the needs of some given period of legal development, or at-
tempts to state the results of the two former attempts universally
and to make them all-sufficient for law everywhere and for all time.
Historians of the philosophy of law have fixed their eyes chiefly on
the third. But this is the least valuable part of legal philosophy. If
we look at the philosophies of the past with our eyes upon the law
of the time and place and the exigencies of the stage of legal develop-
ment in which they were formulated, we shall be able to appreciate
them more justly, and so far as the law of the time and place or the
stage of legal development was similar to or different from the
present to utilize them for the purposes of today.
We know Greek law from the beginnings of a legal order as pic-
tured in the Homeric poems to the developed commercial institutions
of the Hellenistic period. In its first stage the kings decide particular
causes by divine inspiration. In a second stage the customary course
of decision has become a tradition possessed by an oligarchy. Later,
popular demand for publication results in a body of enactment. At
first enactments are no more than declaratory. But it was an easy
step from publication of established custom to publication of changes
as if they were established custom and thus to conscious and avowed
changes and intentional new rules through legislation. The law of
Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.c. was a codified tradition
eked out by legislation and individualized in its application through
administration of justice by large popular assemblies. Thus in spite
of formal reduction to writing it preserved the fluidity of primitive
law and was able to afford a philosophy for Roman law in its stage of
equity and natural law-another period of legal fluidity. The develop-
ment of a strict law out of codified primitive materials, which in
Rome happily preceded the stage of equity and natural law, did not
take place in the Greek city. Hence the rules of law were applied
with an individualized equity that reminds us of the French droit
coutumier-a mode of application which, with all its good points,
must be preceded by a body of strict law, well worked out and well
understood, if its results are to be compatible with the general security
in a complex social order. In Athens of the classical period the word
vopos, meaning both custom and enacted law as well as law in general,
reflected the uncertainty with respect to form and the want of uni-
formity in application, which are characteristic of primitive law, and
invited thought as to the reality behind such confusion.
We may understand the materials upon which Greek philosophers
were working if we look at an exhortation addressed by Demosthenes
to an Athenian jury. Men ought to obey the law, he said, for four
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reasons: because laws were prescribed by God, because they were a
tradition taught by wise men who knew the good old customs, be-
cause they were deductions from an eternal and immutable moral
code, and because they were agreements of men with each other
binding them because of a moral duty to keep their promises. It was
not long since that men had thought of legal precepts as divinely
revealed, nor was it long since that law had been a tradition of old
customs of decision. Philosophers were seeking a better basis for
them in eternal principles of right. In the meantime in political
theory, at least, many of them were the agreements of Athenian
citizens as to how they should conduct themselves in the inevitable
clashes of interests in everyday life. What was needed above all was
some theory of the authority of law which should impose bonds of
reason upon those who enacted, upon those who applied, and upon
those who were subject to law in such an amorphous legal order.
A sure basis of authority resting upon something more stable than
human will and the power of those who govern to impose their will
for the time being was required also for the problem of social con-
trol in the Greek city-state. In order to maintain the general security
and the security of social institutions amid a strife of factions in a
society organized on the basis of kinship and against the willfulness
of masterful individuals boasting descent from gods, in order to per-
suade or coerce both the aristocracy and the mass of the low born
to maintain in orderly fashion the social status quo, it would not do
to tell them that law was a gift of God, nor that what offended the
aristocrat as a radical bit of popular legislation enacted at the in-
stance of a demagogue was yet to be obeyed because it had been so
taught.by wise men who knew the good old customs, nor that Demos
chafing under some item of a class-possessed tradition was bound by
it as something to which all citizens had agreed. The exigencies of the
social order called for a distinction between vvos and Ira vouocvu
-between law and rules of law. The Minos, which if not actually
a dialogue of Plato's seems clearly Platonic and very close to Plato
in time, is taken up with this distinction and gives us a clue to the
juristic problems of the time.
Another example may be seen in Aristotle's well-known discus-
sion in the Nicomachean Ethics. It is significant that Greek thinkers
always couple custom and enactment; things which today we contrast.
These were the formal bases of legal authority. So Aristotle considers,
not natural law and positive law, but what is just in itself-just by
nature or just in its idea-and what derives its sole title to be just
from convention or enactment. The latter, he says, can be just only
with respect to those things which by nature are indifferent. Thus
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when a newly reconstituted city took a living Spartan general for its
eponymus, no one was bound by nature to sacrifice to Brasidas as to
an ancestor, but he was bound by enactment and after all the matter
was one of convention which, in a society framed on the model of an
organized kindred, required that the citizens have a common heroic
ancestor, and was morally indifferent. The distinction was handed
down to modern legal science by Thomas Aquinas, was embodied in
Anglo-American legal thought by Blackstone, and has become staple.
But it is quite out of its setting as a doctrine of mala prohibita and
mala in se. An example of the distinction between law and rules of
law has become the basis of an arbitrary line between the traditional-
ly antisocial, penalized by the common law, and recently penalized
infringements of newly or partially recognized social interests. Al-
though the discrimination between what is just and right by nature
and what is just because of custom or enactment has had a long and
fruitful history in philosophical jurisprudence and is still a force in
the administration of justice, I suspect that the permanent contribu-
tion of Greek philosophy of law is to be found rather in the dis-
tinction between law and rules of law, which lies behind it and has
significance for all stages of legal development.
Roman lawyers came in contact with philosophy in the transition
from the strict law to the stage of equity and natural law, and the
contact had much to do with enabling them to make the transition.
From a purely legal standpoint Greek law was in the stage of primi-
tive law. Law and morals were still largely undifferentiated. Hence
Greek philosophical thinking of a stage of undifferentiated law and
morals lent itself to the identification of the legal and the moral in
juristic thinking which was characteristic of the classical Roman law-
But the strict law obviously was indifferent to morals and in many
vital points was quite at variance with the moral ideas of the time.
The Greek distinction of just by nature and just by convention or
enactment was suggested at once by such a situation. Moreover the
forms of law at the end of the Republic and at the beginning of the
Empire invited a theory of law as something composite, made up of
more than one type of precept and resting immediately on more than
one basis of authority.
Cicero enumerates seven forms of law. Three of these are not
heard of thereafter in Roman juristic writing. Evidently already in
Cicero's time they belonged to the past and had ceased to be effective-
forms of actual law. The four remaining, namely, statutes, resolutions;
of the senate, edicts of the magistrates, and the authority of those
learned in the law, come to three-legislation, administrative edicts,
and juristic reasoning on the basis of the legal tradition. And' these
1960]
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correspond to the three elements which made up the law. First, there
was the ius ciuile: the Twelve Tables, subsequent legislation, inter-
pretation of both, and the traditional law of the city. Second, there
was the mass of rules, in form largely procedural, which was con-
tained in the edicts. The growing point of the law had been here and
to some extent growth was still going on through this means. Indeed
this part of the law reached its final form under Hadrian. Third, there
-were the writings of the jurisconsults. The growing point of the
law had begun to be here and this was the most important form of
law in the classical period from Augustus to the third century. This
part of the law got its final form in the Digest of Justinian. Of the
three elements the first was thought of originally as declared and
published custom. Later it was thought of as resting on the authority
of the state. It was obviously local and peculiar to Rome. In form
it rested on the legislative power of the Roman people, supplemented
by a mere interpretation of the legislative command with only the
authority of customary acceptance. In Greek phrase it rested on
convention and enactment. The second purported to be the rules
observed by civilized peoples, and on points of commercial law may
well have been an approximation thereto. Apart from this, however,
according to ancient ideas of personal law, the rules which obtained
.among civilized peoples were eminently a proper law to apply be-
tween citizen and noncitizen. In Greek phrase it was law by con-
vention. The basis of the third was simply reason. The jurisconsult
lhad no legislative power and no imperium. The authority of his
-responsum, as soon as law ceased to be a class tradition, was to be
found in its intrinsic reasonableness; in the appeal which it made to
the reason and sense of justice of the iudex. In Greek phrase, if it
was law it was law by nature.
As the rise of professional lawyers, the shifting of the growing
point of law to juristic writing, and the transition from the law of a
,city to a law of the world called for a legal science, there was need
of a theory of what law was that could give a rational account of the
threefold body of rules in point of origin and authority, which were
actually in operation, and would at the same time enable the jurists to
shape the existing body of legal precepts by reason so as to make
it possible for them to serve as law for the whole world. The peren-
nial problem of preserving stability and admitting of change was
presented in an acute form. Above all, the period from Augustus to
the second quarter of the third century was one of growth. But it
was revolutionary only if we compare the law at the end of the period
with the law of the generation before Cicero. The jurisconsults were
practical lawyers and the paramount interest in the general security
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was ever before their eyes. While as an ideal they identified law
with morals they did not cease to observe the strict law where it
was applicable nor to develop its precepts by analogy according to the
known traditional technique when new phases of old questions came
before them. Hence what to the Greeks was a distinction between
right by nature and right by convention or enactment became to
them a distinction between law by nature and law by custom or
legislation. The Latin equivalent of T6 8tKawv (the right or the just)
became their word for law. They said ius where Cicero said lex. And
this convenient ambiguity, lending itself to identification of what
ought to be and what is, gave a scientific foundation for the belief
of the jurisconsults that when and where they were not bound by
positive law they had but to expound the reason and justice of the
thing in order to lay down the law.
It must be borne in mind that "nature" did not mean to antiquity
what it means to us who are under the influence of the idea of
evolution. To the Greek, it has been said, the natural apple was not
the wild one from which our cultivated apple has been grown, but
rather the golden apple of the Hesperides. The "natural" object was
that which expressed most completely the idea of the thing. It was
the perfect object. Hence the natural law was that which expressed
perfectly the idea of law, and a rule of natural law was one which
expressed perfectly the idea of law applied to the subject in question;
the one which gave to that subject its perfect development. For
legal purposes reality was to be found in this ideal, perfect, natural
law, and its organ was juristic reason. Legislation and the edict, so
far as they had any more than a positive foundation of political
authority, were but imperfect and ephemeral copies of this jural
reality. Thus the jurists came to the doctrine of the ratio legis, the
principle of natural law behind the legal rule, which has been so
fruitful both of practical good and of theoretical confusion in inter-
pretation. Thus also they came to the doctrine of reasoning from
the analogy of all legal rules, whether traditional or legislative, since
all, so far as they had jural reality, had it because and to the extent
that they embodied or realized a principle of natural law.
Natural law was a philosophical theory for a period of growth.
It arose to meet the exigencies of the stage of equity and natural law,
one of the great creative periods of legal history. Yet, as we have
seen, even the most rapid growth does not permit the lawyer to ignore
the demand for stability. The theory of natural law was worked out
as a means of growth, as a means of making a law of the world on
the basis of the old strict law of the Roman city. But it was worked
out also as a means of directing and organizing the growth of law
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so as to maintain the general security. It was the task of the jurists
to build and shape the law on the basis of the old local materials so
as to make it an instrument for satisfying the wants of a whole world
while at the same time insuring uniformity and predicability. They
did this by applying a new but known technique to the old materials.
The technique was one of legal reason; but it was a legal reason
identified with natural reason and worked out and applied under the
influence of a philosophical ideal. The conception of natural law as
something of which all positive law was but declaratory, as some-
thing by which actual rules were to be measured, to which so far as
possible they were to be made to conform, by which new rules were
to be framed, and by which old rules were .to be extended or restricted
in their application was a powerful instrument in the hands of the
jurists and enabled them to proceed in their task of legal con-
struction with assured confidence.
But the juristic empiricism by which the ius ciuile was made into
a law of the world needed something more than a theoretical in-
centive. It was a process of analogical development by extension here
and restriction there, of generalization, first in the form of maxims
and later by laying down broad principles, and of cautious striking
out of new paths, giving them course and direction by trial and error.
It was a process very like that by which Anglo-American judicial
empiricism has been able to make a law of the world on the basis of
the legal precepts of seventeenth-century England. Such a process
required something to give direction to juristic reasoning, to give
definite content to the ideal, to provide a reasonably defined channel
for juristic thought. This need was met by the philosophical theory
of the nature of things and of the law of nature as conformity thereto.
In practice jurist-made and judge-made law have been molded con-
sciously or unconsciously by ideas as to what law is for; by theories
as to the end of law. In the beginnings of law men had no more
ambitious conception than a peaceable ordering of society at any
cost. But the Greeks soon got a better conception of an orderly and
peaceable maintaining of the social status quo. When the theory of
natural law is applied to that conception, we get the notion of an
ideal form of the social status quo-a form which expresses its nature,
a perfect form of the social organization of a given civilization-as
that which the legal order is to further and maintain. Thus judge
and jurist obtain a guide which has served them well ever since.
They are to measure all situations by an idealized form of the social
order of the time and place and are so to shape the law as to make
it maintain and further this ideal of the social status quo. We shall
meet this idea in various forms throughout the subsequent history of
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the philosophy of law. It constitutes the permanent contribution of
Rome to legal philosophy.
As soon as scientific legal development begins in the Middle Ages
the law once more comes in contact with philosophy through the
study of both in the universities. What was the need of the time
which philosophy was called upon to satisfy? Following an era of
anarchy and disunion and violence men desired order and organiza-
tion and peace. They called for a philosophy that would bolster up
authority and rationalize their desire to impose a legal yoke upon
society. The period was one of transition from the primitive law of
the Germanic peoples to a strict law, through reception of Roman
law as authoritative legislation or through compilation of the Ger-
manic customary law more or less after the Roman model, as in the
north of France, or through declaration of the customary law in re-
ported decisions of strong central courts, as in England. Thus it soon
became a period of strict law. Scholastic philosophy, with its re-
liance upon dialectic development of authoritatively given premises,
its faith in formal logic, and its central problem of putting reason as
a foundation under authority, responded exactly to these demands. It
is no misnomer to style the commentators or post-glossators of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the "scholastic jurists." For it was
in large part the philosophy that met the needs of the time so com-
pletely which enabled them to put the Roman law of Justinian in a
form to be received and administered in the Europe of nine centuries
later. While they made the gloss into law in place of the text and
made many things over, as they had to be made over if they were
to fit a wholly different social order, the method of dialectical develop-
ment of absolute and unquestioned premises made it appear that
nothing had been done but to develop the logical implications of an
authoritative text. Men could receive the law of Bartolus so long as
they believed it but the logical unfolding of the pre-existing content
of the binding legislation of Justinian. It is interesting to note in
Fortescue an application of this to the rules of the common law in
its stage of strict law. He assumes that these rules are the principles
of which he reads in the commentators on Aristotle and that they may
be compared to the axioms of the geometrician. The time had not yet
come to call rules or principles or axioms in question. The need was
to rationalize men's desire to be governed by fixed rules and to recon-
cile, in appearance at least, the change and growth which are in-'
evitable in all law with the need men felt of having a fixed,
unchangeable, authoritative rule. The scholastic philosophy did
notable service in these respects and, I venture to think, left as a
permanent contribution to legal science the method of insuring cer-
1960]
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tainty by logical development of the content of authoritatively de-
fined conceptions.
On the breakdown of the feudal social organization, the rise of
commerce and the era of discovery, colonization, and exploitation of
the natural resources of new continents, together with the rise of
nations in place of loose congeries of vassal-held territories, called for
a national law unified within the national domain. Starkey proposed
codification to Henry VIII and Dumoulin urged harmonizing and
unifying of French customary law with eventual codification. The
Protestant jurist-theologians of the sixteenth century found a philo-
sophical basis for satisfying these desires of the time in the divinely
ordained state and in a natural law divorced from theology and rest-
ing solely upon reason, reflecting the boundless faith in reason which
came in with the Renaissance. Thus each national jurist might work
out his own interpretation of natural law by dint of his own reason,
as each Christian-might interpret the word of God for himself as his
own reason and conscience showed the way. On the other hand, the
Catholic jurists of the Counter-Reformation found a philosophical
basis for satisfying these same desires in a conception of natural law
as a system of limitations on human action expressing the nature of
man, that is, the ideal of man as a rational creature, and of positive
law as an ideal system expressing the nature of a unified state. For
the moment these ideas were put at the service of a growing royal
authority and bore fruit in the Byzantine theory of sovereignty which
became classical in public law. In private law they soon took quite
another turn. For a new period of growth, demanded by the expan-
sion of society and the breaking over the bonds of authority, was at
hand to make new and wholly different demands upon philosophy.
Glossators and commentators had made or shaped the law out of
Roman materials for a static, locally self-sufficient, other-worldly
society revering authority because authority had saved it from what
it feared, regarding chiefly the security of social institutions and
negligent of the individual life because in its polity the individual
lived his highest life in the life of another whose greatness was the
greatness of those who served him. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries jurists were required to make or shape a law out of these
medievalized Roman materials to satisfy the wants of an active and
shifting, locally interdependent, this-worldly society, impatient of
authority because authority stood in the way of what it desired, and
jealously individualist, since it took free individual self-assertion to
be the highest good. In England the strict law made for feudal
England out of Germanic materials, sometimes superficially Roman-
ized, was likewise to be made over to do the work of administering
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justice to a new world. A period of legal development resulted which
is strikingly analogous to the classical period of Roman law. Once
more philosophy took the helm. Once more there was an infusion into
law of ideas from without the law. Once more law and morals were
identified in juristic thinking. Once more men held as a living tenet
that all positive law was declaratory of natural law and got its real
authority from the rules of natural law which it declared. Once
more juridical idealism led the jurist to survey every corner of the
actual law, measuring its rules by reason and shaping, extending,
restricting, or building anew in order that the actual legal edifice
might be a faithful copy of the ideal.
But the theory of natural law, devised for a society organized on
the basis of kinship and developed for a society organized on the basis
of relations, did not suffice for a society which conceived of itself as
an aggregate of individuals and was reorganizing on the basis of com-
petitive self-assertion. Again the convenient ambiguity of ius, which
could mean not only right and law but "a right," was pressed into
service and ius naturale gave us natural rights. The ultimate thing
was not natural law as before, not merely principles of eternal validi-
ty, but natural rights, certain qualities inherent in man and demon-
strated by reason, which natural law exists to secure and to which
positive law ought to give effect. Later these natural rights came to
be the bane of juristic thinking. Yet they achieved great things in
their day. Under the influence of this theory jurists worked out a
scheme of "legal rights" that effectively secures almost the whole field
of individual interests of personality and individual interests of sub-
stance. It put a scientific foundation under the medieval scheme of
the claims and duties involved in the relation of king to tenants in
chief, out of which the judges had developed the immemorial rights
of Englishmen, and enabled the common-law rights of Englishmen
to become the natural rights of man, intrenched as such in our bills
of rights. Thus it served as a needed check upon the exuberance of
growth stimulated by the theory of natural law. It kept a certain
needed rigidity in a time when law threatened to become wholly
fluid. And this steadying influence was strengthened from another
quarter. The Roman jurisconsult was teacher, philosopher, and prac-
titioner in one. As a lawyer he had the exigencies of the general
security ever before him in that he felt the imperative need of being
able to advise with assurance what tribunals would do on a given
state of facts. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jurists were
chiefly teachers and philosophers. Happily they had been trained to
accept the Roman law as something of paramount authority and so
were able to give natural law a content by assuming its identity with
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an ideal form of the law which they knew and in which they had
been trained. As the Roman jurisconsult built in the image of the old
law of the city, they built on idealized Roman lines. If Roman law
could no longer claim to be embodied authority they assumed that,
corrected in its details by a juristic-philosophical critique, it was
embodied reason.
Both of these ideas, natural rights and an ideal form of the actual
law of the time and place as the jural order of nature, were handed
down to and put to new uses in the nineteenth century. In the grow-
ing law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were but
guides to lead growth into definite channels and insure continuity
and permanence in the development of rules and doctrines. Whether
natural rights were conceived as qualities of the natural man or as
deductions from a compact which expressed the nature of man, the
point was, not that the jurist should keep his hands off lest by
devising some new precept or in reshaping some old doctrine he in-
fringe a fundamental right, but that he should use his hand freely
and skillfully to shape rules and doctrines and institutions that they
might be instruments of achieving the ideal of human existence in a
"state of nature." For the state of nature, let us remember, was a
state which expressed the ideal of man as a rational creature. If a
reaction from the formal overrefinement of the eighteenth century
came to identify this with a primitive' simplicity, in juristic hands
it was the simplicity of a rational ideal in place of the cumbrous com-
plexity of legal systems which had become fixed in their ideas in the
stage of the strict law. Thus Pothier, discussing the Roman categories
of contract and rejecting them for the "natural" principle that man,
as a moral creature, should keep his engagements, declares that the
complex and arbitrary system of Roman law, made up of successive
additions at different times to a narrow primitive stock of legally
enforceable promises, is not adhered to because it is "remote from
simplicity." Again the ideal form of the actual law, which gave con-
tent to natural law, was not an ideal form of historically found prin-
ciples, constraining development for all time within historically fixed
bounds, as in the nineteenth century, but an ideal form of the ratio
legis-of the reason behind the rule or doctrine or institution whereby
it expressed the nature of the rational human being guided only by
reason and conscience in his relations with similar beings similarly
guided. Attempts to fix the immutable part of law, to lay out legal
charts for all time, belong to the transition to the maturity of law.
The eighteenth-century projects for codification and the era of codi-
fication on the Continent, in which the results of two centuries of
growth were put in systematic form to serve as the basis of a juristic
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new start, in form rested upon the theory of natural law. By a sheer
effort of reason the jurist could work out a complete system of
deductions from the nature of man and formulate them in a perfect
code. Go to, let him do so! This was not the mode of thought of a
period of growth but-rather of one when growth had been achieved
and the philosophical theory of a law of nature was called upon for
a new kind of service.
At the end of the eighteenth century Lord Kenyon had determined
that "Mansfield's innovations" were not to go on. Indeed some of
them were to be undone. Equity was soon to be systematized by Lord
Eldon and to become "almost as fixed and settled" as the law itself.
The absorption of the law merchant was complete in its main lines
although in details it went on for two decades. Moreover the legisla-
tive reform movement which followed only carried into detail the
ideas which had come into the law in the two preceding centuries.
For a time the law was assimilating what had been taken up during
the period of growth and the task of the jurist was one of ordering,
harmonizing, and systematizing rather than of creating. Likewise law
had been codifying on the Continent. Down to the end of the nine-
teenth century the codes, whatever their date, in reality speak from
the end of the eighteenth century and with few exceptions are all but
copies of the French code of 1804. Where there were no codes the
hegemony of the historical school led to a movement back to the law
of Justinian which would have undone much of the progress of the
last centuries. The energies of jurists were turned for a time to
analysis, classification, and system as their sole task. Where codes
obtained, analytical development and dogmatic exposition of the text,
as a complete and final statement of the law, was to occupy jurists
exclusively for the next hundred years. We may well think of this
time, as it thought of itself, as a period of maturity of law. The law
was taken to be complete and self-sufficient, without antinomies and
without gaps, wanting only arrangement, logical development of the
implications of its several rules and conceptions, and systematic ex-
position of its several parts. Legislation might be needed on oc-
casion in order to get rid of archaisms which had survived the pur-
gation of the two prior centuries. For the rest, history and analysis,
bringing out the idea behind the course of development of legal doc-
trines and unfolding their logical consequences, were all the apparatus
which the jurist required. He soon affected to ignore philosophy and
often relegated it to the science of legislation, where within narrow
limits it might still be possible to think of creating.
Yet the nineteenth century was no more able to get on without
philosophy of law than were its predecessors. In place of one uni-
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versally recognized philosophical method we find four well-marked
types. But they all come to the same final results, are marked by the
same spirit, and put the same shackles upon juristic activity. They
are all modes of rationalizing the juristic desires of the time, growing
out of the pressure of the interest in the general security by way of
reaction from a period of growth and in the security of acquisitions
and security of transactions in a time of economic expansion and in-
dustrial enterprise.
In the United States, since the natural law of the eighteenth-
century publicists had become classical, we relied largely upon an
American variant of natural law. It was not that natural law ex-
pressed the nature of man. Rather it expressed the nature of govern-
ment. One form of this variant was due to our doctrine that the
common law of England was in force only so far as applicable to our
conditions and our institutions. The attempt to put this doctrine
philosophically regards an ideal form of the received common law
as natural law and takes natural law to be a body of deductions from
or implications of American institutions or the nature of our polity.
Within a generation the Supreme Court of one of our states laid down
dogmatically that primogeniture in estates tail (which by the way is
still possible in one of the oldest of the original states) could not
coexist with "the axioms of the constitution" which guarantees to
each state a republican form of government. More generally, how-
ever, the American variant of natural law grew out of an attempt
at philosophical statement of the power of our courts with respect to
unconstitutional legislation. The constitution was declaratory of
principles of natural constitutional law which were to be deduced
from the nature of free government. Hence constitutional questions
were always only in terms questions of constitutional interpretation.
They were questions of the meaning of the document, as such, only in
form. In substance they were questions of a general constitutional
law which transcended the text; of whether the enactment before the
court conformed to principles of natural law "running back of all
constitutions" and inherent in the very idea of a government of
limited powers set up by a free people. Now that courts with few
exceptions have given over this mode of thinking and the highest
court in the land has come to apply the limitations of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments as legal standards, there are some who say
that we no longer have a constitutional law. For how can there be
law unless as a body of rules declaring a natural law which is above
all human enactment? The interpretation of a written instrument, no
matter by whom enacted, may be governed by law, indeed, but can
yield no law. Such ideas die hard. In the language of the eighteenth
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century our courts sought to make our positive law, and in particu-
lar our legislation, express the nature of American political institu-
tions; they sought so to shape it and restrain it as to make it give
effect to an ideal of our polity.
Later in the nineteenth century natural law as a deduction from
American institutions or from "free government" gave way to a
metaphysical-historical theory worked out in continental Europe.
Natural rights were deductions from a fundamental metaphysically
demonstrable datum of individual free will, and natural law was an
ideal critique of positive law whereby to secure these rights in their
integrity. History showed us the idea of individual liberty realizing
itself in legal institutions and rules and doctrines; jurisprudence de-
veloped this idea into its logical consequences and gave us a critique
of law whereby we might be delivered from futile attempts to set
up legal precepts beyond the necessary minimum for insuring the
harmonious coexistence of the individual and his fellows. This mode
of thought was well suited to a conception of law as standing between
the abstract individual and society and protecting the natural rights
of the former against the latter, which American law had derived
from the seventeenth-century contests in England between courts and
crown. It was easy to generalize this as a contest between the in-
dividual and society, and it became more easy to do so when the
common-law rights of Englishmen secured by common-law courts
against the crown had become the natural rights of man secured to
individual men as against the state by the bills of rights.
Others in England and America turned to a utilitarian-analytical
theory. The legislator was to be guided by a principle of utility. That
which made for the greatest total of individual happiness was to be
the lawmaker's standard. The jurist was to find universal principles
by analysis of the actual law. He had nothing to do with creative
activity. His work was to be that of orderly logical development of
the principles reached by analysis of what he found already given in
the law and improvement of the form of the law by system and
logical reconciliation of details. As it was assumed that the maximum
of abstract individual free self-assertion was the maximum of human
happiness, in the result the legislator was to be busied with formal
improvement of the law and rendering it, as Bentham put it, more
"cognoscible," while the jurist was exercising a like restricted func-
tion so far as he could work with materials afforded exclusively by
the law itself. Not unnaturally metaphysical and historical and
analytical jurists at the end of the century were quite willing to say




Toward the end of the last century a positivist sociological thinking
tended to supersede the metaphysical historical and the utilitarian
analytical. All phenomena were determined by inexorable natural
laws to be discovered by observation. Moral and social and hence legal
phenomena were governed by laws as completely beyond the power
of conscious human control as the movements of the planets. We might
discover these laws by observation of social phenomena and might
learn to submit to them intelligently instead of rashly or ignorantly
defying them. But we could hope to do no more. Except as he could
learn to plot some part of the inevitable curve of legal development
and save us from futile flyings in the face of the laws by which legal
evolution was inevitably governed, the jurist was powerless. Many
combined this mode of thought with or grafted it on the metaphysical-
historical theory and fought valiantly against the social legislation of
the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the
present century with this reinforced juristic pessimism as a base.
Superficially it appeared that the Greek idea of the naturally just,
which in its Roman form of natural law and its eighteenth-century
form of natural rights had made for a creative legal science as long
as such a science had existed, had at length exhausted its possibilities.
Today, however, we hear of a revival of natural law. Philosophy
of law is raising its head throughout the world. We are asked to
measure rules and doctrines and institutions and to guide the appli-
cation of law by reference to the end of law and to think of them in
terms of social utility. We are invited to subsume questions of law
and of the application of law under the social ideal of the time and
place. We are called upon to formulate the jural postulates of the
civilization of the time and place and to measure law and the appli-
cation of law thereby in order that law may further civilization and
that the legal materials handed down with the civilization of the
past may be made an instrument of maintaining and furthering the
civilization of the present. We are told that observation shows us
social interdependence through similarity of interest and through
division of labor as the central fact in human existence and are told
to measure law and the application of law functionally by the extent
to which they further or interfere with this interdependence. For
the era of legal self-sufficiency is past. The work of assimilating
what had been received into the law from without during the period
of equity and natural law has been done. The possibilities of analyti-
cal and historical development of the classical materials have been
substantially exhausted. While jurists have been at these tasks, a
new social order has been building which makes new demands and
presses upon the legal order with a multitude of unsatisfied desires.
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Once more we must build rather than merely improve; we must
create rather than merely order and systematize and logically recon-
cile details. One has but to compare the law of today on such subjects
as torts or public utilities or administrative law with the law of a
generation ago to see that we are in a new stage of transition; to
see that the juristic pessimism of the immediate past, which arose
to save us from taking in more from without while what had beer4
taken already remained undigested, will serve no longer; and to see
that the jurist of tomorrow will stand in need of some new philo-
sophical theory of law, will call for some new philosophical concep-
tion of the end of law, and at the same time will want some new
steadying philosophical conception to safeguard the general security,
in order to make the law which we hand down to him achieve jus-
tice in his time and place.

